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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL SUGAR and HARRY ULMER, 
doing business a.s SUGAR & ULMER, 
a co-partnership, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
HARRY B. MILLER, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 8639 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an action brought by the plaintiffs against 
the defendant seeking payment on a Promissory Note 
in the a1nount of $2,000.00 plus interest that the plaintiffs 
signed as guarantors .and that the defendant signed as 
primary obligor. The defendant counter-claimed, seeking 
an offset upon an alleged amount o'ving for the publica-
tion by the defendant of the Prospectus of Deseret 
Uranium Corporation. 
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By stipulation at the trial, the defendant confessed 
judgment .as prayed in the Complaint (R. 9). This left 
as the only issue the propriety and the amount of the 
offset. The plaintiffs as agent for Deseret Uranium 
Corporation (R. 42, 43), contacted the defendant Harry 
B. Miller, doing business as Lorraine Press, concerning 
the printing of the Prospectus of Deseret Uranium 
Corporation (R. 10 and 12). During this first negotia-
tion, the defendant wa.s informed that he was to be paid 
out of the underwriting proceeds received by Deseret 
Uranium Corporation (R. 16, 47) and the defendant 
indicated that he understood that the money was to come 
from the underwriting (R. 42). 
The defendant printed the Offering Circular and 
thereafter billed Deseret lTranium Corporation for these 
printing serviees (R. 21, 25, 27, 51), (Exs. 2, 3). The 
defendant carried this account on its books in the name 
of Deseret Uranium Corporation \vithout an~ offset 
shown \vhatsoever right up to the tune of trial (R. 27). 
The defendant also looked to the corporation for pay-
ntent during the same period (R. 28). 
During the p·eriod fro1n the first negotiation up to 
the tilne of trial, the defendant, !{r. :Jiiller, had never 
requested the plaintiffs to personally pay the bill (R. 
2-t-, 51), and there is nothing in \Yriting indicating the 
pronli:4e of the plaintiffs to pay the bill or indicating an 
assnn1ption of the responsibility for said payn1ent 
(R. 27). 
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The underwriting by Deseret Uranium Corporation 
"\Vas never completed and no money was received by rea-
son thereof (R. 44 and 50). The plaintiffs received 
nothing by way of consideration either from the corpora-
tion or from the defendant. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT I. 
THAT THE STIPULATION OF TI-IE DEFENDANT PRE-
CLUDES THE COURT FROM MAKING A FINDING ON THE 
COMPLAINT OF NO· CAUSE O·F ACTION. 
POINT II. 
THAT THE COURT'S FINDING THAT PLAINTIFFS 
AGREED TO· PAY THE DEFENDANT IS A .CONCLUSION 
OF LAW NO·T SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT. 
POINT III. 
THAT THE COURT'S FINDING OF FACT THAT THE 
PLAINTIFFS AGREED TO PAY THE DEFENDANT IS 
BARRED BY THE STA·TUTE OF FRAUDS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THAT THE STIPULATION OF THE DEFENDANT PR.E-
CLUDES THE COURT FROM MAKING A FINDING ON THE 
COMPLAINT OF NO· CAUSE OF ACTION. 
The Complaint (R. 1) sets forth the primary obliga-
tion of the defendant .and the secondary obligation of 
the plaintiffs on a certain Promissory Note payable to 
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Continental Bank & Trust Company. The allegations 
of this Complaint were agreed to by stipulation (R. 9). 
Judgment for $2,000.00 plus interest at 6%, totalling 
$2,150.00 plus attorney's fees in the amount of $500.00 
should have been given to the plaintiffs. 
Thereafter to the extent that defendant proved his 
entitlement to a judgment in excess of the judgment 
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, he would be entitled 
to judgment and an offset against the plaintiffs' 
judgment. 
Here the Court in giving judgment to the defendant, 
disregarded the interest and the attorney's fees stipulated 
to by the defendant and to 'vhich the plaintiffs were 
entitled. 
Plaintiffs' contention on this point is necessarily 
applicable only in the event that plaintiffs' contention 
on Point II and III do not prevail. 
POINT II. 
THAT THE COURT'S FINDING THAT PLAINTIFFS 
AGREED TO· PAY THE DEFENDANT IS A CONCLUSION 
OF LA\V NOT SUPPO·RTED BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT. 
The ·Court in it's Findings of Fact X o. 3, erroneou.sly 
eon eludes that the plaintiffs agreed (italirs added)~ 
to pay the defendant for the printing. This agreen1ent 
is a eonelusion of la\v \Yhich is not substantiated by any 
Finding of Fact n1ade hy the Court. ''Thether or not 
there \vas nn agreen1ent "Tas one of the prin1ary issues in 
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5 
the law suit, and whether or not the evidence in the 
record established an agree·ment is a Conclusion of Law. 
Therefore, neither the conclusion as to the agreement 
nor the Conclusions of L.aw designated as such are 
substantiated by any Findings of Fact by the Court. 
There just i.s no appropriate finding to support these 
conclusions. 
POIN'T III. 
THAT THE COURT'S FINDING OF FACT THAT THE 
PLAINTIFFS AGREED TO PAY T'HE DEFENDANT IS 
BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
At the conclusion of defendant's case, plaintiffs 
moved to dismiss urging the Statute of F:rauds as a 
basis therefor. Said n1otion was denied and the Court 
thereafter made it.s finding that the plaintiff agreed to 
pay the defendant for the•printing. This finding and the 
Rubsequenrt conclusion that the defendant is entitled to 
judgment are both barred by the Statute of Frauds. 
Plaintiffs maintain that recovery based upon any 
statements m.ade by the plaintiffs constituting an agree-
ment to pay the defendant is barred by the following 
Section of the Statute of Frauds, Title 25-5-4, Utah Code. 
Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
"In the following cases every agreement sh.all 
be void unless such agreement or some note or 
memorandum thereof is in writing subscribed by 
the party to be charged therewith: 
" ( 2) Every promise to answer for the debt, 
default or miscarriage of another." 
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Those factor.s to be considered in determining 
whether or not a promise comes under the aforesaid 
Statute are as follows: 
(a) Credit Relied Upon. If defendant, 2,1iller, re-
lied solely upon the credit of the plaintiffs, and the other 
following elements are favorable, then the promise of 
the plaintiffs is an original promise not within the Stat-
ute of Frauds. Ho\vever, if any reliance i.s placed upon 
the credit of Deseret Uranium Corporation, then the 
plaintiffs' promise is collateral and is within the Statute 
of Frauds. The general rule is stated in 49 A1n. Jur. 61 
at p. 418: 
·~rt 1nay be asserted generally that an under-
taking ,,~hich renders the promissor a guarantor 
or surety upon a debt owing by a third person who 
is pri1narily liable is "\Yithin the Statute of Frauds 
"\rhether n1ade before, after or contemporaneously 
"\Yi th the inception of the third persons liability 
provided the pro1uisee knows or has reason to 
kno\\~ of the guarantee or suretyship relation. 
The Statute is applicable "~here credit is extended 
priinariJ~~ to the old debtor or ".,.here the tenor of 
the entire transaction is that the promissor pur-
posed to help out the old debtor and verbally 
pro1nised to p.ay his debt.'~ 
In the ca ~{' of }J_, i! erlsc 11 YS. TfT eber) :255 Pac. :?nd 130 
( 0 l'<'g'Oll) the (~ourt st.n ted: 
.. "\.V]lether a pron1ise is original or collateral 
hPfore there is any- delivery of n1aterials or serY-
ieP~ hy- a ereditor n1ay- ordinarily be deternrined 
hy this test: .Did the parties understand that the 
~Pllt'r \Y:ls extt'nding credit for the Inaterials or 
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7 
labor on the credit of the party sought to be 
charged or to him only as a guarantor of payment 
.should another fail to pay." 
In the case of G~tto~uslcy vs. 11 alliburton Oil Well 
CenLenting Co:npany, 287 Pac. 2nd 204 (Okla.), the Court 
held: 
"If credit is given solely to the promissor, it 
is an original promise and not within the Statute 
of Frauds, but if any credit be given to the third 
party, the defendants' promise is collateral and 
must be in writing. Nor does it matter upon which 
of the two parties the plaintiff principally depends 
for p.ayment so long as the third party is at all 
liable to him to do the same thing which the de-
fendant has engaged to do." 
Under these cases and particularly the Gutowsky 
ca.se, it is apparent that the promisee, l\Iiller, must have 
looked solely to the plaintiffs for payment in this matter. 
The evidence does not sustain such a position by the 
defendant. The fact that defendant, l\1iller, looked to 
the corporation rather than to the plaintiff is evidenced 
in many ways. !-Ie was told at the very outset that the 
money was to come from the underwriting of the com-
pany (R. 16, 47); he, himself, admitted that he was look-
ing to the corporation for payment nearly up to the time 
that the law suit wa.s filed ( R. 28) ; his billings were all 
made to the corporation and not to the plaintiffs (R. 
21, 25, 27, 51); no demand in writing or otherwise was 
made to the plaintiffs for the payment of this amount 
(R. 24) ; and finally, the defendant carried the account 
on its books in the narne of Deseret Uranium Corporation 
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never showing an alleged offset for payment of the $2,-
000.00 (R. 27, 28). 
The last fact involving the record of the account 
is vitally important in the determination of the reliance 
by the promisee upon the credit of the promi.ssor. The 
rule is set forth in 49 Am. Jur. 94 as follows: 
"The fact that goods are charged on the books 
of a merchant to the person for whose use they 
were furnished i.s prima facie evidence, at least 
that they were sold on his credit, and not exclu-
sively on the credit of the person orally promising 
to be responsible for the price; and the fact that 
at the time the goods are delivered to the third 
person they are charged to both the promissor and 
such third person ha.s been held not to be sufficient 
to render an original undertaking." 
In the rase of lVood vs. Dodge, 120 X.\\T. 77± (S.D.), 
the Court said : 
"In determining to 'vhom, as between the 
promissor. and the person for "~hose benefit the 
promise is 1nade, the credit "~as actually given, 
an important consideration is the manner in which 
the creditor entered the transaction in his books. 
Evidence that the goods sold \vere charged to the 
person to "~hon1 they "~ere delivered strongly 
tends to sho" .. that the Yendor gave credit to hun 
and relied upon hilu for pay1nent~ and therefore, 
that the pro1nise of another to be ans,Yer.able for 
the d<-•ht \Yas, at n1ost, a collateral undertaking." 
In this eonneetion~ 8t't' al8o Jl cJI ill au vs. D·ickover, ~-±S 
r~ae. ln-± (Or<>.)~ 59 .A ... L.R. 181. 
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In v1ew of the foregoing facts, it is impossible to 
find that the defendant relied entirely upon the credit 
of the plaintiffs in the furnishing of the printing of the 
Prospectus. Defendant's own witness rebuts this po.sition 
in indicating that defendant was told at the outset that 
the n1oney "\Vas to come from the underwriting. Further-
more, the Prospectus, at Page 7, indic.ates the obligation 
of the cornpany to pay for the printing services out of 
the undervvriting proceeds. The defendant in printing 
the Prospectus \\-rould certainly be aware of such a 
prOVISIOn. 
(b) Consideration to Promissor. In order that the 
promise to pay can be considered as an original promise, 
there must be an independent conside1~ation benefiting the 
promissor. Hovv-ever, as stated in 49 Atn. Jur. 73, p. 425; 
the mere exj stance of consideration doe.s not make the 
promise an original one: 
"The provision that a man should not be held 
in his promise to pay the debt of another unless 
the agreement is in writing does not render un-
necessary a con.sideration for such promise when 
written. As has been well said, if the circumst.anees 
of the promise having been founded on a consid-
eration is sufficient to take it out of the statute, 
the law is precisely the same now as it was before 
the statute was passed, and one of the most impor-
tant statutes, has by construction become a dead 
letter." 
In the case at bar, no consideration was to pass to 
the plaintiffs, other than th.at to which they were already 
entitled for the acquisition of properties and for the 
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rendering of services for the corporation (R. 10, 11 and 
12). There is no evidence of any independent considera-
tion or benefit pas.sing to the plaintiffs by reason of the 
printing of the Prospectus. The plaintiffs benefited only 
indirectly from the printing of the Prospectu_s and any 
benefit accruing to the plaintiffs was no more and no 
different than that accruing to the corporation. 
The case of J annsen vs. Curtis et al, 47 Pac. 2nd 662 
(Wash.), involved the case of a principal stockholc:er who 
controlled the corporation and ".,.ho or.all;; promised to 
pay the corporation's obligation. The Court in holding 
that the promise was within the Statute of Frauds stated: 
"The promise was to answer for the debt of 
the corporation. Not being in writing, it will not 
support an action unless there "~as some benefit 
or consideration different from that accruing to 
the corporation itself." 
This line of cases is discussed in S A.L.R. 1193~ 35 
A.L.R. 2nd 906. Again in the case of K-i.ng \S. Schnall. 57 
N.\\T. 2nd 287 (Neb.), the Court held that: 
"A consideration to support a pron1ise not in 
"'riting to pay the debt of another Inust operate 
to the advantage of the pron1issor, and place hiln 
under a pecuniary obligation to the pro1nissee 
independent of the original debt, "~hich obligation 
is to be diseharged by the pay1nent of that debt." 
(~ertainl)· under the nboYe principals, it cannot be 
said that tlH•rp "·.as nny consideration pa.ssing to the 
pro111is~or~ thP plain tiff~~, sufficient to support an original 
pron1 i ~~t' to pay· the printing bill. 
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(c) Pr·imary Obligation Nat Extinguished. The. 
third factor to consider in determining whether or not 
the alleged promise to pay is an original or collateral 
obligation is the statu.s of the corporation's obligation. 
If the obligation continues after the promise is made, the 
promise is collateral. 
In the case of Richardson Press vs. Albright, 224 
N.Y. 497, an officer of the company promised to see that 
the printing debt of the company was paid. The pro-
mis.sor had a controlling interest in the comp~any. The 
account was carried by the printer under the co1npany 
name. Judge Pound in giving the decision of the Court, 
held that even though there might be a new considera-
tion to the defendant (the promissor) and even though 
he might have a beneficial interest in the accomplishment 
of the printing, the primary debt of the corporation 
remained. He stated: 
"The tenor of the entire transaction was that 
defendant purposed to help out the Oceanic Com-
pany and verbally promised to pay its debts .... 
the ancient purpose of the Statute of Fraud.s w.as 
to require satisfactory evidence of the promise 
to answer for the debt of another p·erson, and its 
efficacy should not be wasted by unsubstantial 
verbal distinctions." 
In the case of Mid-Atlantic Appliances, Inc. v. Mor-
gan, 73 S.E. 2nd 385 (Virginia), 35 A.L.R. 2nd 899, the 
Court held that notwithstanding the promise of the cor-
poration officer to pay the debt of the corporation, the 
corporation's debt still remained unextinguished and th.at, 
therefore, the officer's pro1nise wa.s a collateral promise 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
within the application of the Statute of Fr.auds. This 
principal is well annotated in 35 A.I.J.R. 2nd 906. 
Certainly in the case at bar, the obligation of Deseret 
Uranium Corporation remained in existence notwith-
standing the alleged promise by the pl.aintiffs to pay the 
debt. This is evidenced by the fact that as we have indi-
cated above, the defendant, Miller, himself indicated in 
answer to the question : "You were still expecting the 
corporation to pay the full amount of the bill?", he 
answered, "Oh, definitely, because l\1:r. Uln1er called 
me about it and asked me that question. ..._ud so did Paul 
Sugar. They both called me.'' This is further evidenced 
by the fact that the corporation was continually billed 
for the services, the records of the defendant sho\Yed the 
account in the name of the corporation \Yithout any off.set 
of the alleged personal payment of $2,000.00, and by the 
fact that the Prospectus represented that certain monies 
fro1n the proceeds of the under\Yriting were to be used 
for the printing expenses. 
S1~~I~IA.RY 
The farts involved in the subject case and the con-
tention of the defendant 'Yith respect thereto nfford us 
nn Pxcellent exau1ple of the neressity of the .application 
of this section of the Statute of Frauds. lTpon the bare 
verbal clain1 of the defendant, the plaintiffs here have 
had plaeed upon the1n a liability of $2,468.00. This, not-
withstanding the fact that no definite terrns as to the 
tinH~ or as to the tern1s of payn1ent have been show11 
by thP dc\fendant. Such uneertainty aceo1upanying such 
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a liability should not be resolved in favor of the de-
fendant n1erely upon his lone understanding of the facts. 
To shift to the plaintiffs an obligation clearly that 
of Deseret U rani urn Corp·oration should require not 
merely an uncertain verbal statement, but rather a writ-
ten instrument clearly defining the terms of the trans-
action. I-Iere the plaintiffs relied upon the defendant 
being paid from the underwriting proceeds. The defend-
ant, however, did not rely entirely upon the plaintiffs. 
He was clearly told, a.s is indicated by defendant's wit-
ness, that the p·ayment would be out of the underwriting 
proceeds. To submit the plaintiffs to the po_ssibility 
of such uncertainty and such liability as is here attempted 
IS one very good reason for adhering to the concepts 
of the Statute of ],rauds. 
In view of the foregoing authorities and of the appli-
cation of the facts of the case at bar to the legal principles 
established by said .authorities, Appellants respectfully 
maintain that the judgment of the lower Court be re-
versed, that the defendant take nothing by his Counter-
Claim and that plaintiffs have judgment in accordance 
with the Complaint and Stipulation p-ertaining thereto. 
CLYDE & MECHAM 
By ------------------------------------------------------
Elliott Lee Pratt 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Appellants 
351 South State Street 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
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